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it seems clear that the possession and acts of ownership were consistent with the
nature of the property, and such as one claiming ownership thereof would
naturally employ. It is now settled that color of title is not a requisite of ad-
verse possession.10
As a survey acquiesced in by the adverse possessor will not affect a title
previously acquired under the law of adverse possession it is obvious that the
survey ordered by the trial court could not affect appellant's title acquired prior
to such time.1 1
W. K. H.
SALES-CANNED FODS--IMPLIED WAitRANTY.-Plaintiff's wife purchased at
one of the retail stores of the defendant, a jar of preserves. Plaintiff was eating
the preserves when he bit into something soft and gummy which, upon examina-
tion, proved to be part of a mouse. He thereupon became nauseated and
vomited several times. This continued for some time thereafter and he was
wholly disabled from doing any work for a time and partly disabled for some
time thereafter. Plaintiff sued in assumpsit based on an implied warranty of
merchantability. Held, defendant is not liable because the injury suffered by
plaintiff was the result of mental shock and the physical consequences thereof,
and he was not injured physically from the preserves or any foreign substance
contained therein. Lower court verdict for $400 damages reversed, and judg-
ment entered for defendant.1
As the court points out in this case, when a wife buys necessaries for her
family and her husband, a primary presumption arises that the wife is acting
as agent for her husband, as the duty to pay for the necessaries rests on him.
The wife's separate estate will not be bound for debts contracted by her while
acting as such agent or messenger unless the evidence convinces the jury that
the wife was acting in her own right independent of her husband, but the
husband will be bound.2 Thus, plaintiff has the right to sue on the warranty.
10 Root v. Beck (1886), 109 Ind. 472, 9 N. E. 698, Cravens v. Cravens
(1914), 181 Ind. 553, 103 N. E. 333, Logsdon v. Dingg (1904), 32 Ind. App.
158, 69 N. E. 409; Bowman v. Guiblis (1866), 26 Ind. 419; Hargis v. Con-
gressional Twp. (1867), 29 Ind. 70; Stole v. Portsmouth (1885), 106 Ind. 435,
7 N. E. 379; May v. Dobbins (1906), 166 Ind. 331, 77 N. E. 353.
11 Cleveland, etc., Co. v. Obenchain (1886), 107 Ind. 591, 9 N. E. 624,
Riggs v. Riley (1887), 113 Ind. 208, 15 N. E. 253, Davis v. Waggoner (1908),
42 Ind. App. 115, 83 N. E. 381, Fatic v. Myer (1904), 163 Ind. 401, 72 N. E.
142; Rosenmeier v. Mahrenhold (1912), 179 Ind. 467, 101 N. E. 721, Wood v.
Kuper (1898), 150 Ind. 622, 50 N. E. 755, Helton v. Fastnow (1904), 33 Ind.
App. 288, 71 N. E. 230; Spacy v. Evans (1898), 152 Ind. 431, 52 N. E. 605.
1 Young v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1936), 15 F Supp. 1018.
2 Dublino v. Natale (1935), 118 Pa. Super Ct. 301, 304, 179 A. 821, 822.
Also see Guarenire et ux. v. Bessemer Lumber Co. (1935), 214 Ala. 8, 106
So. 49 (Husband's liability under wife's contract to pay for building materials) ;
Woodruff v. Perrotti et ux. (1923), 99 Conn. 639, 122 A. 452 (Wife employed
atty. to defend husband), Vaughan v. Mansfield (1918), 229 Mass. 352, 118
N. E. 652 (Wife pledged husband's credit for medical services) , B. Altman &
Co. v. Rosenfeld (1917), 162 N. Y. S. 678, 98 Misc. Rep. 236 (Wife bought coat
on husband's credit), Stevens v. Hush (1919), 176 N. Y. S. 602, 107 Misc.
Rep. 353 (Wife contracted for room and board at hotel), Evenson v. Nelson
(1918), 39 N. D. 523, 168 N. W 36 (Wife left to manage farm and pledged
husband's credit) , Gore et al. v. Whiteville Lumber Co. (1918), 110 S. C.
478, 96 S. E. 683 (Where husband leaves wife in possession of land she can
COMMENTS
A warranty is an express or implied statement of something which a party
undertake to be part of a contract, and, though part of the contract, collateral to
the express object of it.3
When there is a sale of goods, and an examination of them is impractical, a
warranty will be implied by law that they are merchantable. 4 A warranty is
"implied" when under the rules of law it is considered to have been made
without express words to that effect. A warranty is an undertaking collateral
to the contract of sale and gives rise to the same liability whether express or
implied.3
Under the early common law a breach of warranty was considered as
having more the aspect of a tort than breach of contract. Today a breach of
warranty is an act or omission which lies between a breach of contract and a
tort. Plaintiff can sue in tortG or in contract, basing his suit on the contract,
although the measure of damage may be different in each action. II plaintiff
has bought goods from a retailer and desires to sue the manufacturer for de-
fects therein, he must sue in tort in most jurisdictions, as it is held that a
warranty from a manufacturer to a retailer will not run to customers of the
retailer, but only to the retailer himself.7 The manufacturer is under a tort lia-
bility to the retailer's customers if they are injured due to a defect in the
article manufactured, and the manufacturer should have foreseen that the article
would have been inherently dangerous if improperly constructed, due to latent
defects. The manufacturer is under an affirmative duty to use due care.8 The
decided weight of American authority permits a consumer to recover against the
manufacturer for the negligent manufacturing or preparation of foods, irre-
spective of any contractual relation between the parties.9
At early common law no warranties were implied, and there was no express
warranty unless the "magic word" warranty was used in the contract.1 0 The
bring action of trespass, as agent of the husband), Davenport v. Rutledge
(1916), 187 S. V 988, Texas Court of Civil App. (Wife called doctor to at-
tend child); Milhollin et al. v. Milhollin (1919), 71 Ind. App. 477, 126 N. E.
36 (Rules of agency between husband and wife are same as other rules of
agency).
3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Baldwin's Student Ed.).
4 Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co. (1893), 25 N. Y. S. 570, 43 N. E. 422.
The term merchantability does not require that the article sold shall be of
the first quality, but in the ordinary course of business be vendible on the
market and at the average price of such article referred to in the contract.
Adolph Goldmark and Sons v. Simon Bros. Co. (1923), 110 Neb. 614, 194
N. W 686.
Apples being perishable, there is no implied warranty by the seller that they
will continue sound or merchantable for a definite period or for any period
after delivery-Rinelli v. Rubino (1918), 69 Ind. App. 314, 120 N. E. 388, Mc-
Neil & Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co. (1921), 274 F 397, Philip Olim
& Co. v. C. A. Watson & Sons (1920), 204 Ala. 179, 85 So. 460.
G Hausken v. Hodson-Feenaughty Co. (1920), 109 Wash. 606, 187 P 319.
6 For a good discussion of the tort aspect of this subject see Mitchell v.
Rochester R. R. Co. (1896), 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354.
7 Nelson v. Armour Packing Co. (1905), 76 Ark. 352, 90 S. W 288.
8 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050,
L. R. A. 1916 F., 696, Ann. Cas. 1916 C., 440.
9 Doyle v. Continental Baking Co. (1928), 262 Mass. 516, 160 N. E. 325,
Ketterer v. Armour & Co. (1912), 200 F 322; Salmon v. Libby (1906), 219
Ill. 421, 76 N. E. 573. See cases collected in 63 A. L. R. 343.
10 Chandelor v. Lopus (1625), Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3.
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courts began to imply a warranty of fitness for purpose where the buyer, ex-
pressly or by implication, made known to the seller the particular purpose for
which the goods were required, and it appeared that the buyer relied on the
seller's skill or judgment in the selection of the goods. The common law on this
point was affirmed and codified by sec. 15, par. 1, of the Sales Act."1 In par. 2,
sec. 15, the act provides for an implied warranty of merchantability where the
goods are bought by description from a dealer dealing in goods of that descrip-
tion. The above provisions are in force in Pennsylvania.1 2 Under sec 15, par.
4, of the act, there is no warranty of fitness for purpose when goods are sold
under a patent or trade name, the theory being that the buyer does not rely
on the seller's judgment when such goods are bought.13 There is, however, a
warranty of merchantability.14
Thus it appears that no warranty of fitness for purpose will arise unless the
buyer expressly or by implication relies on the seller's judgment in the selection
of the goods.' 5 By the weight of authority it appears that, both at common law
and under the Sales Act, a retailer is liable on an implied warranty of fitness
for purpose if proximate injury results from a sale of canned goods which are
not fit for human consumption. The result reached by the case is hard to justify
as a matter of logic, and MainelO and Kentucky' 7 refuse to follow the general
rule. The retailer has no supervision over the canning of the food and has no
knowledge or means of knowledge concerning the presence of any foreign sub-
stance in the can. The buyer knows that the seller has bought the food from
another, in sealed cans, and that he has no knowledge of the contents thereof.
The decision, however, is justifiable. Where canned food is purchased it is
a necessary inference that the food is to be eaten. The cans on the retailers
shelves are all sealed and identically labeled, and from the nature of things
neither party can inspect the goods before the sale. The dealer, however, is in
a better position to ascertain and determine the responsibility and character of
the manufacturer than is the purchaser. The majority view seems best as it
places the responsibility on him who is best able to protect himself and recoup
losses, namely, the dealer. He may sue the retailer, who in turn has his remedy
over against the manufacturer. The retailer has a more intimate contact with
11 Cook v. Darling (1910), 160 Mich. 475, 481, 125 N. W 411.
12 (Act of May 19, 1915, P L. 543, Sec. 15, Par. 2, 69 P. S. Pa. Sec. 124,
Par. 2).
IsAcorn Silk Co. v. Herscovitz (1925), 250 Mass. 553, 146 N. E. 35; Ire-
land v. Louis K. Liggett (1922), 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 371, Iron Fireman
Coal Stoker Co. v. Brown et ux. (1931), 182 Minn. 399, 234 N. W. 685.
14 Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc. (1931), 255 N. Y. 388, 175
N. E. 105.
15Perry v. Johnson (1877), 59 Ala. 648, Farrel v. Manhattan Market
(1908), 233 Ill. 430, 84 N. E. 481, Glucose Sugar Refining Co. v. Climax Coffee
& Baking Powder Co. (1907), 40 Ind. App. 182, 81 N. E. 589; Katherine Gear-
ing v. John Berkson (1916), 223 Mass. 257, 111 N. E. 785; Eversole v. Hanna
(1914), 171 S. W 25, Kansas City Missouri Court of App; Kinch v. Haynes
(1908), 111 N. Y. S. 618, 58 Misc. Rep. 499; Bartlett v. Hoppock (1865), 34
N. Y. 118, 88 Am. Dec. 428, Hargous v. Stone (1851), 5 N. Y. 73.
Also see Uniform Sales Act sec 15, par. 1.
16 Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R. (1912), 110 Maine 105, 110, 85 A. 396.
Also see dissenting opinion in Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
(1918), 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225.
17 Walden v. Wheeler (1913), 153 Ky. 181, 154 S. W 1088.
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the manufacturer; he is the one who has dealt with him, and thus the burden
is placed on him who is in the best position to prevent the injury. The courts
should, as many do, presume that the buyer relies on the seller in the selection
of canned foods.' 8
The suit was filed on the theory of breach of warranty of merchantability
under see. 15, par. 2, of the act, and not on a warranty of fitness for purpose,
the intention of the pleader probably being the avoidance of the requirement of
sec. 15, par. 1, of the act, which makes a reliance on the seller's judgment a
condition precedent to recovery on a breach of warranty for fitness for purpose.
Thus recovery may be had under par. 2 when the action would fail if brought
under par. 1 because the purchaser bought under a trade name,1 9 or for some
other reason.
At common law warranties of merchantability were limited to sales by manu-
facturers or growers. 20 This rule has been changed by the Uniform Sales
Act,2 1 so that a warranty is implied when the goods are bought by description
from one who deals in goods of that description.
In the principal case the controlling question under discussion was the
measure of damages. It seems that the court clearly follows authority in holding
the defendant not liable. Special damages can be recovered only in exceptional
cases
22 
where the damages suffered are within the contemplation of the parties
at the time the contract is made, or the proximate result of the breach of war-
ranty, and can be ascertained with a reasonable degree of accuracy. 2 3 The
injury to plaintiff was purely mental; the injury was caused by an emotional
disturbance; 2 4 he was not poisoned or injured physically. Defendant could not
have foreseen such a reaction on the part of the plaintiff when he discovered
18 Anna Sloan v. F W Woolworth (1915), 193 Ill. App. 620; Leahy v.
Essex Co. (1914), 148 N. Y. S. 1063, Wren v. Holt (1903), 1 K. B. 610.
10 Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc. (1931), 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E.
105.
20 Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc. (1931), 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E.
105; Bierman v. City Mills Co. (1897), 151 N. Y. 482, 45 N. E. 856, 37 L. R. A.
799, 56 Am. St. Rep. 635.
21 Williston, Sales (1924), vol. 1, sec. 232, 233. See Uniform Sales Act sec.
15, par. 2.2 2Kime v. Riddle (1917), 174 N. C. 442, 93 S. E. 946.
23 Hodges v. Smith (1912), 159 N. C. 525 75 S. E. 726, Mullerleile et ux. v.
Brandt et ux. (1911), 64 Wash. 280, 116 P 868, Columbia Motors Co. v. Wil-
liams (1923), 209 Ala. 640, 96 So. 900; Peppers et al. v. Metzler (1922), 71
Colo. 234, 205 P 945; People's State Bank of Butterfield v. Randby (1924), 158
Minn. 305, 197 N. V 265, Hope Engineering & Supply Co. v. D. N. Lightfoot
& Sons (1917), 193 S. W 624; Hausken v. Hodson-Feenaughty Co. (1920),
109 Wash. 606, 187 P 319; Hoffman v. Hockfield Bros. (1921), 75 Pa. Super.
Ct. 595, Feneff v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. (1909), 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436.
See Uniform Sales Act sec. 69, par. 6.
Also see Bolger v. Boston Elevated R. R. Co. (1910), 205 Mass. 420, 91
N. E. 389; Whitcomb v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. (1913), 215 Mass. 442, 102
N. E. 663. See (1916) 16 Columbia L. Rev. 122; Dill v. O'Ferrell (1880), 69
Ind. 500 (The question of the amount of damages for breach of warranty is
peculiarly for the determination of the jbry).
For a valuable discussion see Sachter v. Gulf Refining Co. (1923), 209 N. Y.
App. Div. 391, 203 N. Y. S. 769; General Motors Truck Co. v. Shepard Co.
(1925), 47 R. I. 153, 130 A. 593.
24 Ewing v. P. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (1892), 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340, 14 L. R. A.
666, 30 Am. St. Rep. 709; Howarth v. Adams Express Co. (1921), 269 Pa. 280,
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the mouse in the preserves. To allow recovery under the circumstances of this
case would open the door wide to fraud, as there is no standard by which dam-
ages could be measured. N.C.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CONVICT MADE GOODS-INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Plaintiff asked for mandamus to compel defendant railroad to carry un-
branded, convict made horse collars, harness, and strap goods in interstate
commerce. Defendant refused the tendered shipments because of the Ashurst-
Sumners Act,' a federal statute, which, (1) prohibited the interstate trans-
portation of goods made by convict labor "where such goods are intended
. . to be received or in any manner used, either in the original
package or otherwise" in states, etc. contrary to their laws, (2) directed that
all packages containing such goods be properly marked, including "the name
and location of the penal or reformatory institution." Three classes of ship-
ments were involved: (1) Those to states whose laws prohibited the sale of
convict made goods. (2) Those to states whose laws did not prohibit such
sale, but required that the goods be marked to show that convicts had made
them. (3) Those to states which imposed no restriction upon sale or possession.
Held. Both provisions are constitutional, and the labeling provision is valid
no matter what the law of the state of destination. Mandamus denied.
2
The case is significant because it upholds the power of Congress to prohibit
the movement of harmless, useful goods in interstate commerce. Previous
prohibitions had been confined to goods inherently harmfula or goods whose
evil lay in the purpose of the transportation 4 or to giving effect to policies of
Congress in relation to instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 5
The Ashurst-Sumners Act seemed to stand midway between two opposing
lines of cases-those upholding federal regulation of interstate shipment of
such things as diseased livestock,6 lottery tickets, 7 women for immoral pur-
poses,8 and intoxicating liquor0 on the one side, and the Child Labor decisionlO
on the other. The Act had its prototype in the Webb-Kenyon Act,1 1 but liquor
was recognized as inherently harmful to health and morals. The Supreme
Court chose the approach of the liquor case,1 2 and bridged the gap between
112 A. 536, Houston v. Freemansburg Borough (1905), 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022,
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 149; Linn v. Duquesne Borough (1903), 204 Pa. 551, 54 A.
341, 93 Am. St. Rep. 800.
149 Stat. 494, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 61-64.
2 Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1937), 57 S.
Ct. 277
3Hipolite Egg Co. v. U. S. (1911), 220 U. S. 45, 31 S. Ct. 364. (Bad eggs).
4 Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321. (Lottery Tickets).
Hoke v. U. S. (1913), 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281. (Women for immoral pur-
poses).
5 U. S. v. Delaware and Hudson Co. (1908), 213 U. S. 366, 29 S. Ct. 527.
0Reid v. Colorado (1902), 187 U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92.
7 Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321.
8 Hoke v. U. S. (1913), 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281.
9 Clark Distilling Co, v. Western Maryland R. Co. (1917), 242 U. S. 311,
37 S. Ct. 180.
10 Hammer v. Dagenhart (1917), 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529.
1137 Stat. 699; 27 U. S. C. A. sec. 122.
12 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co. (1917), 242 U. S. 311,
37 S. Ct. 180.
